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Abstract
In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder
to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant
protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks
arising from this capability.
Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable to this type of attack are given, including Lowe’s modifi-
cation of KSL. The consequences for automatic verification tools are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols have been the subject of study for a long time. Consequently,
there have been many frameworks developed to verify security protocols, for instance
[8,26,11,12]. Common to most frameworks is the assumption that the adversary
has complete control over the network and is only limited by the constraints of
cryptographic operations. The first attempt to precisely formulate this idea was
done in the early 1980s by Dolev and Yao [13].
Dolev and Yao’s threat model assumes that the adversary is a legitimate user of
the network, able to be a receiver to any user on the network, obtain any message
passing through the network, and trying everything he can in order to discover the
plaintext of an encrypted message.
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Not all formal methods adopt all of these requirements. For instance, BAN
Logic [8] does not consider insider attacks. This leads the three-line Needham-
Schroeder public-key authentication protocol, shown in Figure 1, to be provably
correct in BAN Logic in spite of the existence of an interleaving attack on it, as
was first shown by Lowe [21]. Most modern formal methods do implement Dolev
and Yao’s intruder model but differ in their interpretation of it. For example, one
major difference among the frameworks is that some of them allow the adversary
to carry out type-flaw attacks and others do not.
pk(r), sk(i)
i
pk(i), sk(r)
r
nonce ni
➀
{i, ni}pk(r)
nonce nr
➁
{ni, nr}pk(i)
➂
{nr}pk(r)
Fig. 1. Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
A type flaw occurs when the type of a message can be misinterpreted [7], for
example, when one agent’s encrypted term may be interpreted as a nonce by another
agent. The adversary’s attempt to use such a misinterpretation to his own advantage
is called a type-flaw attack.
In fact, if we assume the order of the message components as in Figure 1, the
Needham-Schroeder protocol is susceptible to the type-flaw attack where a malicious
agent uses his name instead of a nonce in the first message in order to impersonate
another agent. The attack requires two parallel sessions and is shown in detail in
Figure 2. We write a : r(b, a) to denote that agent a executes the responder role r
assuming that the corresponding initiator role i is executed by agent b. Similarly,
eve(b) : i(b, a) means that the intruder eve impersonates b executing the initiator
role in a session with agent a executing the responder role. There are mechanisms
to ensure correctness of types throughout the execution of a protocol, for instance
by message tags [15], therefore the absence of type-flaw considerations in some
formalizations can be justified.
In this paper, we introduce and discuss new intruder abilities concerning the
dynamic selection of names for compromised agents and potentially even for honest
agents. In contrast to the well-known type-flaw attacks, such as the one shown on
the Needham-Schroeder protocol, which are based on the assumption that agent
names are static, we allow the adversary to choose dynamically created terms as
the name of an agent. Dynamic agent naming is typically not being considered by
protocol verification frameworks and tools.
While it is easy to craft secure protocols that are susceptible to what we call the
chosen-name type-flaw attacks, we don’t expect these attacks to be found frequently
in real-life protocols. However, to prove their existence, we also show a chosen-
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a : r(b, a) eve(b) : i(b, a) eve : i(eve, b) b : r(eve, b)
➀
{b, eve}pk(a)
na
➁
{eve, na}pk(b) {eve, na}pk(b) {eve, na}pk(b)
nb
{na, nb}pk(eve)
na
➂
{na}pk(a) {nb}pk(b)
“I am talking to b”
secret na knows na
Fig. 2. Type-flaw attack on Needham-Schroeder
name type-flaw attack on a published protocol upon which previously no attacks
were known. In the attack, using a dynamically created name, the intruder takes
advantage of a type flaw to learn a shared key. This type-flaw attack would not be
possible with a static name.
The new attacks and intruder capabilities presented here were discovered during
a systematic analysis of the Cremers-Mauw semantics [11] and have, to the best of
our knowledge, not been taken into account in any formalization.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce the general notion of chosen-
name attack and present our main results in Section 2, we discuss related work in
Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4.
2 Chosen-name attacks
2.1 Preliminaries
A chosen-name attack occurs when the intruder violates a security property by
generating a suitable name or identity for an agent. Clearly, the less restricted an
agent’s name space is, the more likely this type of attack is to occur.
We distinguish between two types of chosen-name attacks. In a selected-name
attack, the intruder can select arbitrary names for compromised agents only, while
in an assigned-name attack the intruder may additionally assign arbitrary names to
uncompromised, i.e. honest agents. Aside from the fact that assigned-name attacks
are much more specialized than selected-name attacks, the two classes also have
distinct targets. In selected-name attacks malicious agents choose their name to
attack other agents, hence the veracity of security properties for these agents may
be ignored, while in assigned-name attacks the victim may very well be the agent
that is being assigned a name. Note that while the attacker may assign a name to
an honest agent in order to attack another victim, in general these attacks can also
be executed as selected-name attacks.
Although attacks that would fit our definition of chosen-name attacks have been
known and described in the literature, they have not been treated as a class of
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their own, but have been rather occurring as instances of other classes, such as
impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, or relay attacks. The chosen-
name type-flaw attacks, however, are new and did not receive attention before. In
the rest of this section we will therefore restrict ourselves to chosen-name type-flaw
attacks. We will discuss existing chosen-name attacks in Section 3.
2.2 Selected-name attacks
We consider attacks where the intruder dynamically selects the names of conspiring
agents in such a way that a security claim fails due to a type flaw. We split these
selected-name attacks into two subclasses. The first class consists of those attacks
where an agent’s selected name will be accepted without further scrutiny, while the
second class requires the name to be confirmed or accepted by a third party, for
instance by a certificate authority or a key server.
We begin by presenting and discussing a protocol vulnerable to an attack from
the first class and then discuss Lowe’s modification of the KSL protocol which is
vulnerable to an attack from the second class. In both cases we only consider
secrecy, even though our methods can be used to attack any security property.
2.2.1 A flawed key-establishment protocol
k(i, s)
i
k(r, s)
r
k(i, s), k(r, s)
s
➀
i
➁
{r, i}k(r,s)
generate kir
➂
{3, kir, i, r}k(r,s)
➃
{4, kir, i, r}k(i,s)
nonce nr
➄
{r, {nr}k(r,s)}k(r,s)
➅
nr
secret kir secret kir secret kir
Fig. 3. Key-establishment protocol
Consider the protocol in Figure 3. It is a fictitious key establishment protocol
combined with a liveness check. The premise is that initiator i and server s share
the secret key k(i, s) and similarly responder r and server s share the secret key
k(r, s). On i’s communication request to r in message , r contacts the server s
in , who then distributes a fresh secret key kir to r and i in messages  and .
When r receives the new key kir he generates a nonce nr to check liveness of the
server in  and . To demonstrate the selected-name attack, the liveness check
is implemented in a non-standard manner. The security claim of this protocol for
all three roles is that kir is secret, as indicated by the hexagons at the end of the
protocol.
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Since this is a specially crafted protocol, we first sketch why the protocol achieves
its security goals in the absence of type-flaw attacks. The key kir is freshly produced
by s, and transmitted only in messages  and , encrypted with k(r, s) and k(i, s),
respectively. In both messages, kir is concatenated with i and r and encrypted with
keys known only to s and one of i and r. Thus each of the messages binds kir, i, r,
and s together. It follows that kir is secret for i, since all messages containing kir
are bound to the intended agents, must have been produced by the intended agent,
and are only readable by the intended agents. The same reasoning can be applied
for r and s’s secrecy claim.
Next, we consider conventional type flaws. It is evident that messages , ,
and  cannot interfere with each other due to the message identifiers contained in
messages  and . Messages  and  are supposed to be distinguishable by the
fact that one contains an agent name and the other one an encryption term. In a
conventional type-flaw attack, an adversary may attempt replacing message  in a
certain run by message , possibly from another run. In the present protocol, this
attack would be futile, as it would, at best, lead to an encryption term {i}k(r,s)−1 .
This term would not be useful for the adversary to break the secrecy of kir, since
it does not fit the type of any other message.
k(a, srv)
a : i(a, b, srv)
k(b, srv)
b : r(a, b, srv)
k(a, srv), k(b, srv)
srv : s(a, b, srv) eve(b) : r(a, b, srv)
k(b, srv)
b : r({3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv), b, srv)
➀
a
➁
{b, a}k(b,srv)
generate kab
➂
{3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)
➃
{4, kab, a, b}k(a,srv)
{3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)
{3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)
{b, {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)}k(b,srv)
{b, {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)}k(b,srv)
➄
{b, {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)}k(b,srv)
type confusion
(3, kab, a, b) and nb
➅
(3, kab, a, b)
knows kabsecret kab
Fig. 4. Attack on key-establishment protocol
Finally, in a selected-name attack, the replacement can be attempted in the
other direction, too, i.e. message  in a certain run may be replaced by message 
from another run. Figure 4 shows a trace demonstrating this attack. Assume that
the adversary controls two agents, an agent called eve who pretends to be b and an
agent who will be named {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv). Agent eve listens to a conversation
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between the honest agents a, b, and srv . When message  is sent from srv to b, eve
intercepts this message and the agent with the name {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv) is created.
This agent initiates a session with a second run of b. Following the protocol, agent
b constructs the message {b, {3, kab, a, b}k(b,srv)}k(b,srv) which he sends to srv . The
adversary intercepts this message and injects it into the first session as message
, impersonating b to srv . Agent srv tries to decrypt the message and obtains
(3, kab, a, b) due to a type confusion. This quadruple is sent back in the clear
allowing the adversary to learn kab.
2.2.2 Lowe’s modified KSL
The selected-name attack presented in the previous section only required the ad-
versary to select names for the agents he controls. Some selected-name attacks
additionally require the conspiring agent to have his selected name accepted by
a third party, for instance when obtaining a symmetric key associated with the
name from a key server or a certificate from a certificate authority. The ability to
obtain key material or certificates for a chosen name is plausible in identity-based
encryption and signature schemes and in systems where users may have one or more
pseudonyms.
k(i, s)
i
k(r, s), k(r, r)
r
k(i, s), k(r, s)
s
nonce ni
➀
ni,i
nonce nr
➁
ni, i, nr, r
generate kir
➂
{i, nr, kir}k(r,s),
{ni, r, kir}k(i,s)
nonce nr′
➃
{ni, r, kir}k(i,s), nr′,
{Tr, i, kir}k(r,r), {r, ni}kir
➄
{nr′}kir
secret kir secret kir
Fig. 5. Lowe modified KSL
As an example of a protocol vulnerable to a selected-name attack under the
assumption that the chosen name is accepted, we consider the KSL protocol [16]
including the modifications suggested by Lowe in [20]. In [22] an exact modeling of
Lowe’s modifications is provided. We will focus on the authentication phase of this
protocol, shown in Figure 5, and omit the reauthentication protocol.
This protocol is similar to the key-establishment protocol discussed in the previ-
ous example in that in messages  through  i contacts r, who in turn contacts the
P. Ceelen et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 31–4336
key server s to obtain shared secret keys. Here, however, nonces are generated and
sent in the first two messages, and neither of the first two messages is encrypted.
Further, the server s does not deliver the encrypted shared secret key to i directly,
but rather sends it to r in message , who forwards the encrypted key along with
another fresh nonce nr′, a ticket {Tr , i, kir}k(r,r), and i’s original nonce encrypted
under the shared secret key to i. Finally, i sends back nr′ encrypted with the
received shared secret key kir. The ticket in message , is only used for the reau-
thentication protocol which we have omitted. It is encrypted with the key k(r, r)
known only to r and contains a generalized time stamp, Tr , made with respect to
r’s local clock. The fact that the key k(r, r) is only known to r prevents everybody
but r to tamper with the ticket or create such a ticket. In the reauthentication
protocol r uses Tr to check the validity of the ticket.
Until now, there have been no attacks known on this protocol. In fact, if our
chosen-name attacks are disregarded, then the secrecy claims of the protocol can
be shown to be correct using, for instance, the Cremers-Mauw semantics [11].
k(a, s)
a : i(a, b, s)
k(b, s), k(b, b)
b : r(a, b, s) eve
k(a, s), k(b, s)
s
nonce na
➀
na, a
nonce nb
➁
na, a, nb, b k(nb, s)
nb : r(b, nb, s)
a, b, na, nb
type confusion
nonce nb and name a
generate k(b, nb)
{b, na, k(b, nb)}k(nb,s),
{a, nb, k(b, nb)}k(b,s)
k(b, nb)
➂
{a, nb, k(b, nb)}k(b,s)
{b, na, k(b, nb)}k(nb,s))
nonce nb′
➃
{b, na, k(b, nb)}k(nb,s), nb′,
{Tb, a, k(b, nb)}k(b,b), {b, na}k(b,nb)
➄
{nb′}k(b,nb)
secret k(b, nb) knows k(b, nb)
Fig. 6. Attack on Lowe modified KSL
To carry out a selected-name attack, as described in Figure 6, the attacker waits
for a to initiate a session with b and s. The adversary then creates an agent with the
name nb which he observed in message . This agent obtains a valid key k(nb, s) and
pretends that b has initiated a session with him by sending the message (a, b, na, nb)
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to s. In this message s interprets a as a nonce and nb as a name and responds with
a newly generated key, k(b, nb), for b and nb. Agent nb can decrypt the first part of
the message to learn the key k(b, nb). He then reverses the order of the two parts
of the message and forwards them to b. Agent b decrypts {a, nb, k(b, nb)}k(b,s) and
thinks that k(b, nb) is the freshly generated key that he should use in his session
with a. He then forwards the ticket {b, na, k(b, nb)}k(nb,s) together with a newly
created nonce nb′ to a. The adversary intercepts this message and respond to it by
encrypting the nonce nb′ with the key k(b, nb) and impersonating a.
2.3 Assigned-name attacks
So far we have considered the adversary’s ability to select the names of conspiring
agents. In some settings, however, the adversary might even be able to assign
names to honest agents. One example would be a compromised naming authority,
another possibly more realistic example, would be a compromised DHCP server. In
the latter scenario, a protocol which uses IP-addresses to identify agents could be
vulnerable to an assigned-name attack.
Consider a variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol where the
nonces in the second message have been swapped as shown in Figure 7. The NSL
protocol is a mutual authentication protocol that has originally been shown to
be correct by Lowe [21] and since then by several other authors as well. The
swapping of the two nonces has no influence on the correctness of the protocol
even when conventional type flaws are taken into consideration. For simplicity, we
are restricting ourselves to the secrecy claims of the protocol.
pk(r), sk(i)
i
pk(i), sk(r)
r
nonce ni
{ni, i}pk(r)➀
nonce nr
➁
{nr, ni, r}pk(i)
{nr}pk(r)➂
secret ni, nr secret ni, nr
Fig. 7. A variant of NSL
Figure 8 demonstrates an assigned-name attack on the NSL variant. An honest
agent b starts a conversation with a malicious agent eve by sending {nb, b}pk(eve).
The adversary then assigns the name (nb, e) to another honest agent. This honest
agent starts a conversation with b and produces an encryption term of the form
{nnbe, (nb, e)}pk(b). The conversation between the two honest agents continues and
at the end of the protocol, (nb, e) and b agree on a secret value nnbe. The adversary
takes the first message of this conversation and inserts it into the running session
between b and eve. Agent b receives this message and confuses the name (nb, e)
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sk(b), pk(eve)
b : i(b, eve)
sk(eve), pk(b)
eve : r(b, eve)
sk(bs)
b : r((nb, e), b)
nonce nb
{nb, b}pk(eve)
sk((nb, e)), pk(b)
(nb, e) : i((nb, e), b)assign name
nonce nnbe
➀
{nnbe, (nb, e)}pk(b)
{nnbe, (nb, e)}pk(b)
nonce nb′
type confusion
name (nb, e) and
nonce, name pair ➁
{nb′, nnbe, b}pk((nb,e))
➂
{nb′}pk(b)
{nnbe}pk(eve)
secret nnbe secret nnbeknows nnbe
Fig. 8. Assigned-name attack
with nonce nb and name eve and responds with the message {nnbe}pk(eve) which
enables the adversary to learn the value nnbe. Thus, the secrecy of nnbe claims of
the honest agents (nb, e) and b are falsified by this attack.
This attack can be modified to impersonate b to nb and invalidate both secrecy
claims of nb as follows. When (nb, e) sends out the first message of the protocol, the
adversary can block the communication between the agents (nb, e) and b and inject
the message {nnbe, (nb, e)}pk(b) into his run with b to learn nnbe. He then picks a
nonce ne to construct the message {ne, nnbe, b}pk((nb,e)). The adversary now knows
both nonces and has furthermore impersonated b to nb. The security claims of b
are not invalidated though, since b does not finish the protocol.
3 Related Work
The attacks we have described in this paper belong to the intersection of two classes,
namely chosen-name attacks and type-flaw attacks.
Chosen-name attacks have been known and described in the literature in various
forms. For instance, it is known that in public key infrastructures a malicious or
sloppy certificate authority would make it possible for an attacker to impersonate
any user by registering under the user’s name or a slight variation of the user’s name.
A particular instance of this attack, which is known as the homograph or unicode
attack [14], is the registration of Internet domain names resembling well-known
domain names. This attack became particularly popular when internationalized
domain names became available, since, for instance, several Cyrillic characters are
identical to Latin characters allowing two distinct Internet domain names to have
the same appearance.
A cryptographic impersonation attack, due to flawed key certification schemes,
has been described by Lenstra and Yacobi [17]. In principle, such attacks can also
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be carried out on identity-based encryption schemes if the private key generation al-
gorithm is weak. For instance, in Boneh and Franklin’s scheme, it is easy to see that
the possibility of a chosen-name attack hinges on the quality of the cryptographic
hash function H1 [6, Section 4.1].
Another source of chosen-name attacks are man-in-the-middle attacks on au-
thentication protocols. A malicious agent seeking access to a resource would wait
for an honest agent to initiate a vulnerable authentication protocol and consequently
select the honest agent’s name to perform the attack. In fact, the attack in Fig-
ure 2 is another example of a chosen-name man-in-the-middle attack. The attacker
chooses and impersonates the agent b to obtain access to a. Similarly, in relay at-
tacks, for instance on protocols running on radio frequency devices, a rogue device
would forward the authentication challenge it receives to any victim it can find in
the vicinity.
While all these attacks are well-known and have been extensively studied, they
are different from the type-flaw attacks considered in this paper, either in that they
are not type-flaw attacks at all, or in that the chosen name is static.
Since the introduction of type flaws in security protocol analysis [7] various
approaches have been used to detect and prevent type flaws. In [15] a tagging
scheme is presented that prevents simple type flaws. Simple type flaws occur when
one variable is unified with a complex term or a variable of another type.
More complex type-flaw attacks are described in [23]. These attacks emerge
when tags are confused with terms or when parts of a term are confused with
another term. The detection of complex type flaws is formalized in [23,24,18,19].
Research in this area focuses on the transitions from abstract message specification
into concrete bit strings and vice versa.
Some of the formal frameworks aiming at verification of security protocols have
included the concept of simple type-flaw attacks in their models, for instance [26,1,11].
We have investigated whether the tools based on these models, namely ProVerif [4],
Scyther [10], the constraints solver in prolog [25], and the four tools of the Avispa
project (CL-Atse[27], OFMC[3], SATMC [2], TA4SP [5]), are able to detect chosen-
name attacks. These tools cover most of the modern techniques used in protocol
verification, such as model checking, constraint solving, SAT-solving, and approxi-
mation. Since all of the selected tools provide a specification of the NSL protocol,
only minor modifications were necessary to test the NSL variant in Figure 7. None
of the selected tools were able to detect the selected-name attack described in Fig-
ure 8.
For Scyther and the Avispa tools it is easy to see why the attack could not be
found. Scyther has a fixed domain out of which the names of agents are picked.
The reason why none of the Avispa tools was able to find an attack is related
to their input language, HLPSL. This language requires the user to define a set
of concrete sessions under consideration. This set typically only contains sessions
between agents with normal names. In order to find a chosen-name attack, one
has to set up a session where the name of one of the agents is a concrete run
term. Since the set of concrete run terms is infinite, it is not possible to list all
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potential chosen-name attack scenarios. This implies that for an Avispa tool using
the HLPSL input language to find a chosen-name attack, the attack has to be known
in advance. OFMC cannot find chosen-name type-flaw attacks, even in its native
input language, due to an over-optimizing design choice in its symbolic session
generation algorithm [3, §6.3].
We could not pinpoint the exact reason why the constraint solver in prolog did
not find the assigned-name attack, as it seems that this formalism does not require
a special domain for the names of honest agents. This formalism does however
limit the names of the attacker, as a constant  is used to represent his name,
and thus precludes the detection of selected-name attacks. In ProVerif the default
implementation of NSL uses the public key of an agent to identify the agent. Instead
of sending {na, nb, b}pk(a) the second message is modeled by {na, nb, pk(b)}pk(a).
Another way to model agent names in ProVerif is via the host() function, but even
in that case, the attack could not be found.
Most formal models underlying tools for verification of security protocols can be
extended to express chosen-name attacks. However, it will not necessarily be easy
to extend the tools themselves. Especially tools that search through the state space
of a given finite scenario will face the problem of having to choose appropriate agent
names from an infinite domain.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an intruder ability which was overlooked in common
interpretations of the Dolev-Yao threat model and we demonstrated how this ability
can be used to construct a special class of type-flaw attacks. We have identified a
structure related to this intruder ability and classified the newly found attacks.
We have shown that Lowe’s modified KSL protocol is vulnerable to a selected-
name attack and that a mere reordering of two nonces renders the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol vulnerable to an assigned-name attack.
Type-flaw attacks on a protocol are intimately related to the implementation of
the protocol. The attacks presented in this paper are infrequent, but as realistic as
any other type-flaw attack and therefore should be taken into account by those tools
and models which attempt to detect type flaws. Protocols vulnerable to this new
class of attacks can be corrected like protocols vulnerable to type-flaw attacks by
rearranging fields in messages, by adding extra information in vulnerable messages,
such as was for instance done in messages and of the fictitious key-establishment
protocol in Section 2.2.1, or by using tagging schemes such as those proposed in [15].
A way to prevent chosen-name type-flaw attacks in particular, is to precisely define
the agent’s name space and enforce strict name checking.
This work shows that the common Dolev-Yao interpretation is not complete
with respect to the requirement that the adversary tries everything he can in order
to learn a certain message. For instance, in [9] it is shown that from any attack
on a secrecy claim involving n agents, an attack can be constructed which involves
only two agents, assuming that agents may talk to themselves. The construction
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essentially maps all dishonest agents to one agent and all honest agents to the other
agent. The attacks introduced in this paper indicate that the security of a protocol
can depend on the names of the agents. It is possible to construct protocols where
an attack requires the adversary to select several names for dishonest agents. If
one agent can only have one name, such an attack requires more than two agents.
This shows that the results in [9] do not hold under the present intruder model.
It is conceivable that there are other subtle assumptions made in the common
interpretation of Dolev-Yao.
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